2020年10月13日学术报告通知

发布时间:2020-10-10

内容摘要:

 Firms weigh the costs of public disclosure against the benefits of information  transparency when disseminating narrative R&D information. In this paper, we examine  whether firms with more private information dissemination channels will reduce their public disclosure of narrative R&D information by investigating the effect of directors’ network  connection on firms’ narrative R&D disclosure quantity. Consistent with our expectation, we find that firms with better-connected directors disclose less narrative R&D information. This association is stronger for firms with: (1) higher litigation risk, (2) higher proprietary costs, (3) more opportunities to interact with directors at other firms, and (4) weaker corporate governance. Our results remain robust to employing the staggered adoption of Universal Demand laws as a quasi-natural experiment, measuring the content of narrative R&D disclosure, using alternative measures of board network, and controlling for institutional ownership and number of analyst following. Collectively, our findings suggest that directors’connection may serve as a private channel of disseminating narrative R&D information,  substituting for the public channel of disclosure.